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CONFLICT OF LAWS — JURISDICTION — DOMICILE — ORDINARY  
RESIDENCE— ALLEGIANCE— IN FAN T— WARD OF COURT.
The law is to be found in the breasts of the judges. This 
remark often appears in earlier cases where judges reached a 
conclusion unsupported by any existing case law or statute. The 
same technique is employed in a recent case, In re P. (G. E .) (an 
Infant),1 decided in 1964 by the Court of Chancery in England. 
This case involved the jurisdiction of the court over an infant.
The infant was born in Egypt of Jewish parents on February 
15, 1956. The parents had been married in Egypt. At that time 
the father was stateless and the mother Egyptian. In February, 
1957, as a result of the Suez crisis, the father and mother left 
Egypt with the infant and went to England where the mother had 
relatives living. In order to obtain an exit visa the mother gave 
up her Egyptian nationality and became stateless. In January, 
1962, they set up a matrimonial home in Brighton. In April of 
that year each signed an application for naturalization, stating that 
each intended to live in the United Kingdom. However, the appli­
cations were never brought to a conclusion and neither parent 
became a British subject. In August, 1962, as a result of quarrels, 
the mother left the matrimonial home and went to live with her 
own mother in Hendon. It was arranged that the infant would live 
with his mother and go to school there during the week and spend 
the weekends with his father in Brighton. On Friday, November 9,
1962, the father collected the infant for the weekend in the usual 
way. On the following day he flew with the infant to Israel; and 
on November 11, when the mother was expecting the son’s return, 
she received a cable from the father informing her that they were 
both in Jerusalem. They had remained there ever since. The 
evidence before the court showed that the father and the infant 
had left England under the aegis of a travel document issued to 
stateless persons by the Home Office, the document in form afford­
ing no diplomatic or consular protection to the holder while abroad 
but entitling him (unless the contrary was stated) to return to the 
United Kingdom within three months. The father also had a 
tourist visa for three months from the Israeli government; but in 
his own affidavit he stated that when he went to Israel with the 
infant he did so with the intention of making his permanent home 
there. At the date of the hearing of his summons he and the 
infant had acquired Israeli nationality.
1 [1965] Ch. 568.
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On Jahuary 4, 1963, the mother issued a summons under the 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, and the 
Guardianship of Infants Acts, 1886 and 1925, seeking, inter alia, 
to make the infant a ward of the court; but as she did not make 
the necessary appointment, the infant was not made a ward of the 
court. The mother having obtained leave to serve the father out 
of the jurisdiction, he entered appearahce under protest, and on 
October 2, 1963, took out a summons seeking to have the mother’s 
summons set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
Plowman, J. held that the court had no jurisdiction in ward­
ship proceedings over an alien infant not physically present in 
England, ahd set aside the mother’s summons. The mother 
appealed.
On appeal the court noted that the Court of Chancery would 
have had jurisdiction on either of two grounds: (1) that the infant 
was a British subject, or (2) that the infant was physically present 
in England. But in this case the infant was neither a British subject 
hor physically present in England. There was no established 
authority to give the court jurisdiction.
It was submitted on behalf of the mother that the Court of 
Chancery would have jurisdiction through the authority of the 
Crown as parens patria. This jurisdiction had two bases: (1) 
domicile, or (2) ordinary residence. In order to succeed in this 
case it would be necessary to show that the concept of ordinary 
residence should replace that of domicile as the determining factor 
in questioning the court’s jurisdiction. It was argued that it was 
time to do away with domicile as the sole test of jurisdiction. 
Counsel for the mother said that the major defect of the doctrine 
of domicile is that it depends on the intention of the person to 
establish a permanent home and that domicile cases have been 
greatly criticized because of their artificial results. The contention 
was that the court had jurisdiction oh the ground that the child 
was ordinarily resident in England and, therefore, owed allegiance 
to and had a corresponding right to protection by the Crown.
The judges were faced with a difficult task. It seems obvious 
that they wanted to find some ground on which to base a decision 
that the court had jurisdiction over the infaht. Convinced that the 
father was guilty of a moral wrong, they strove to find a way to 
avoid such injustice.
The only available basis for a favourable decision was ordi­
nary residence. But no case had been decided in which the concept
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of ordinary residence had been used by the court as the basis of 
its decision. This did not deter the court. Lord Denning M.R. 
said:2
When we come upon a situation which has not arisen before, 
we must say what we believe the law to be upon the matter. We 
are not to be deterred by the absence of authority on the books.
Our forefathers always held that the law was locked in the 
breasts of the judges, ready to be unlocked whenever the need 
arose.
The need had arisen. The court decided that the test of ordinary 
residence was to be preferred to that of domicile, for the tests of 
domicile are archaic and artificial and would produce strange 
results if applied in the context of a jurisdiction which historically 
is closely connected with allegiance. Lord Denning M.R. said:2
The tests of domicile are far too unsatisfactory. In order to find 
out a person’s domicile, you have to apply a lot of archaic rules.
They ought to have been done away with long ago
Once again we have evidence of the willingness of Lord Denning 
to make new law where other judges would hesitate to do so. But 
in this case the other members of the court agreed. Pearson L J . 
said:3
The rules for ascertaining domicile are, in some respects, artificial 
and unrealistic and would produce strange results if domicile were 
taken as the basis of jurisdiction to make a wardship order.
Russell L.J. said:4
The whole trend of English authority on the parental jurisdiction 
of the Crown over infants bases the jurisdiction on protection as 
a corollary of allegiance in some shape or form. Domicile is an 
artificial conception which may well involve no possible connec­
tion with allegiance.
Having done away with the doctrine of domicile, the court 
next looked to the concept of ordinary residence and proceded to 
find there a basis of jurisdiction. The court held that an alien 
infant ordinarily resident in the country owes an allegiance to the 
Crown, and, as a corollary to that allegiance, has a right to protec­
tion from the Crown, and, therefore, to the parental jurisdiction 
of the Crown exercised through the High Couit.
Where did the court get its support for introducing the test 
of ordinary residence?— from the law of treason. It was pointed 
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tioru? that allegiance continues if the person himself goes out of 
the country but leaves his family and effects there. He cannot 
throw off his allegiance simply by departing from the country. 
So long as he is in the country, or is ordinarily resident there, he 
owes allegiance to the Crown and correspondingly comes under 
its protection. Here lay the foundation of the court’s decision.
At first glance it would seem odd that a case on treason 
should have affected the decision of a custody case. But this is 
really not that surprising. What the courts are really concerned 
with in each case is the extent to which they are willing to extend 
their jurisdiction beyond the borders of the country. There is a 
growing need for expanding the jurisdiction of the courts to deal 
with new problems created by the increasing mobility of people. 
A by-product of this mobility is statelessness. Years ago there was 
no need for the courts to exercise jurisdiction over stateless persons. 
But today statelessness is fairly common. In the ordering of society 
it has become necessary that national courts reach out and respond 
to the pressures of what is fast becoming a world community.
Having decided that ordinary residence would give the court 
jurisdiction, the court easily found that the infant was in fact 
ordinarily resident in England. As indicating the feeling of the 
court it was held that where an infant, ordinarily resident in the 
country, had been taken out of the country in circumstances where 
some element of force, deception or secrecy is involved, justice, 
convenience and the trend of authority require that the wronged 
parent or parents should be able to obtain relief in the English 
High Court of Justice.
Although the court had established jurisdiction over the 
infant, the question whether the jurisdiction should as a matter 
of discretion be exercised to make the child a ward of the court 
must be determined in other proceedings, when all the circum­
stances were before the court, and in the light of what was best 
for the infant.
This is another example of the willingness of judges to move 
with the times. By virtually throwing the doctrine of domicile out 
the window, and finding a new basis for jurisdiction they have 
opened new roads for the future.
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